Your first reply isn’t even an anecdote. You’re simply doubting what I experienced and the experience is validated (source: CoPilot):

I’m not doubting that Windows could repair a drive that Linux couldn’t. Linux filesystem repair tools for proprietary filesystems like NTFS and ExFAT aren’t very good because they’re reverse engineered.

What I doubt is that connecting an external HDD with filesystem errors would cause a Linux system to hang. I’ve connected countless drives in various stages of failure without ever having one hang the whole system.

$5 usb Bluetooth working fine in Windows. -Maybe Linux is simply racist?

The Chinese manufacturer only makes drivers for their cheap knockoff hardware for Windows. The vast majority of people’s complaints about Linux can be solely attributed to lack of commercial support. Just look at how much has changed about Linux gaming since Valve started investing time and money into WINE/Proton.

It’s not realistic to expect the community to develop flawless drivers for all the cheap hardware you’ll find. Even if we assumed that all the hardware was fully documented (which it almost never is), there aren’t enough people volunteering their time to actually write the code. When you add in the time required to reverse-engineer it, it gets even worse.

This I just flatly don’t believe. Do you have any citations, or am I supposed to just take your word for it?

Currently stickied on r/linuxsucks with sources for the first two claims. The third was in the installation manual for RedHat which I no longer have access to or can find sources for. -Somewhere it’s documented.

…So that’s a no?

Yeah, ok. That hardware is better defense than a software solution and is backed by legit professionals.

I don’t disagree that the TPM is a fantastic hardware solution for cryptographic key storage. I’m just not under the mistaken impression that it automagically makes Windows safer just by existing. If you knew anything at all about how it actually works, you’d see that it’s not some panacea for malicious software. Assuming a user doesn’t just click [Next>] whenever a software prompt appears, it can help safeguard a machine from invisible infections. But the vast majority of software infections come from software masquerading as legit and tricking the user into installing it.

There’s nothing stopping a malicious actor from creating a program that tricks a user into installing a malicious key into the TPM and allowing that malicious software to run in the same trusted manner as the Windows bootloader would. Thus achieving the same rootkit/bootkit infections that are currently possible on non-TPM machines.