https://lawrence.video/The Signal Foundationhttps://signalfoundation.org/Matthew Green Article on Signalhttps://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2024/08/25/t...
I think their product direction is a bit better. Particularly as Signal still shows a message that they don’t back sync messages before you paired devices “for your security” … Threema also doesn’t back sync messages in their beta multi device setup, but that seems to be more less of a product stance and more of a “we just don’t do it yet.”
Threema is definitely missing some features like emoji reactions, stories, and a builtin cryptocurrency (which depending on your stances might be pros or cons).
Both apps have definitely gotten better over the years; I think Threema’s multi device support has really drained resources on their side so there hasn’t been as much outward feature work. I’m hoping it won’t be terribly long until that changes.
While it isn’t necessarily an argument against Threema’s security, I think it’s important to consider that Threema is owned by a privately held company [1[2]] — Signal is owned by a non profit [3].
Signal Foundation formed in 2018 to support Signal Messenger which originated in 2012. Through the Foundation, we have been able to support Signal’s growth and ongoing operations as well as investigate the future of private communication.
I almost think that’s a pro. I don’t understand how signal intends to pay for servers forever with voluntary donations. Though I’d be fine if they set up a mandatory annual fee.
Signal is far more polished IMO but both are great.
Ah, so there is! [1][2[3]] I didn’t notice that. Thank you for pointing out that inconsistency in my previous comment; what I stated was conjecture, and, lo and behold, it turned out to be wrong.
Threema Libre is available exclusively via F-Droid. It requires a Threema Shop license, and the F-Droid app needs to be installed on your Android device.
I don’t understand how signal intends to pay for servers forever with voluntary donations.
I think donations can be sustainable if the service in question is handled correctly. Imo, federation/decentralization would improve this, as it wouldn’t place the cost burden on a single entity.
If you’re seriously concerned about privacy and security I wouldn’t look at Threema. They severely mishandled vulnerabilities by insulting the security researchers, then introduced a new protocol they built with the advice given to them for free from the SAME researchers before that, and yet it still doesn’t support critical features like full forward secrecy. If all you want primarily is the best security out there Signal is and will be the best for a long time to come by the looks of it.
I think that’s a characterization of what happened but not necessarily a good representation of what actually happened.
Yes, some researchers in Zurich found vulnerabilities. Yes they down played them … because you still couldn’t read anything. They were also already working on a new protocol before those researches wrote their paper and yes I’m sure they made some tweaks based on their findings.
This is the same protocol they were already working on when the “researches they insulted” released their research finding issues with the old protocol.
They severely mishandled vulnerabilities by insulting the security researchers, then introduced a new protocol they built with the advice given to them for free from the SAME researchers before that, and yet it still doesn’t support critical features like full forward secrecy.
As you said, if PFS can be disabled by enabling a feature on the receiving end it’s by security practices not enabled, in the industry that’s called a downgrade attack and considered very bad practice.
The blog post you linked, is the publicly revised version after they were called out by well known cryptographers for their handling. This was their original response to the researchers, again after the researchers disclosed the vulnerabilities to them and actively helped designing the new protocol, not just giving inspiration. This was their initial tweet: „There’s a new paper on Threema’s old communication protocol. Apparently, today’s academia forces researchers and even students to hopelessly oversell their findings“ which is long deleted, but I did read it while it was still up back then. I can’t find a screenshot or anything at the moment, so if you want to call me a liar, go ahead but if you search for that quote you will find many citations.
Also, they claimed „old protocol“ but Ibex was still months from being deployed widespread, so that’s another big downplay.
You mention Signals Desktop app issue, Threema claimed the attacks were unrealistic because they require significant computing power or social engineering, both things that are definitely a risk if you’re trying to protect yourself from bigger intelligence efforts. The issue with Signal Desktop however, required full file system access to your device at which point, there is nothing stopping the attacker from simply using a key logger, capturing your screen, etc.
This is why no big security researchers called out Signal but many shunned Threema. At the end I don’t have a horse in the race for either of them, but I think those are facts people need when making a decision with their private information.
As you said, if PFS can be disabled by enabling a feature on the receiving end it’s by security practices not enabled, in the industry that’s called a downgrade attack and considered very bad practice.
I don’t have an iOS device to know for sure but I’m fairly certain they inform you and participants in your chats about the PFS interruptions. It’s a temporary problem you have to deal with to use a beta application.
One of their devs was on mastodon talking about how PFS was more complicated with their design than they expected because they need to sync up the devices. Signal took the approach of sending one message to every device and Threema sends it to one of your devices and then that device sends it to the others. From what I understand this makes the PFS session key synchronization harder for Threema so it’s not implemented yet.
This was their initial tweet: „There’s a new paper on Threema’s old communication protocol. Apparently, today’s academia forces researchers and even students to hopelessly oversell their findings“
The issue with Signal Desktop however, required full file system access to your device at which point, there is nothing stopping the attacker from simply using a key logger, capturing your screen, etc.
Right but in practical terms many of the findings cited against Threema were equally if not more doubtful. I don’t know who the “big security researchers” you’re referencing are, but … as someone in the tech sector myself I do tend to agree that we’ve gotten to a place of really happenstance exploits being sold as if they’re like the old zero days where the user doesn’t have to do anything, it works 100% of the time, and the user loses control of their system.
If that quote is real … I think they were probably just miffed that the researchers didn’t discuss the fact that they were already in the later design stages of protocol improvements and made their findings sound far more plausible to exploit than they were.
There’s just a double standard here too… Threema gets shit for downplaying an exploit where you literally have to have physical access to the device, but it’s totally fine that signal didn’t even use basic operating system functionality (the keychain) to protect data at rest – that’s a physical AND digital risk?
I don’t see any insults and the vulnerabilities were patched.
I agree that they downplayed it a bit, but back then they were still a for profit company. Now they are non-profit and it is in their interest to handle such cases in a way that is more aligned with their customers instead of their profits.
I’m copying my other response since you both had the same issue with my statements:
As you said, if PFS can be disabled by enabling a feature on the receiving end it’s by security practices not enabled, in the industry that’s called a downgrade attack and considered very bad practice.
The blog post you linked, is the publicly revised version after they were called out by well known cryptographers for their handling. This was their original response to the researchers, again after the researchers disclosed the vulnerabilities to them and actively helped designing the new protocol, not just giving inspiration. This was their initial tweet: „There’s a new paper on Threema’s old communication protocol. Apparently, today’s academia forces researchers and even students to hopelessly oversell their findings“ which is long deleted, but I did read it while it was still up back then. I can’t find a screenshot or anything at the moment, so if you want to call me a liar, go ahead but if you search for that quote you will find many citations.
Also, they claimed „old protocol“ but Ibex was still months from being deployed widespread, so that’s another big downplay.
You mention Signals Desktop app issue, Threema claimed the attacks were unrealistic because they require significant computing power or social engineering, both things that are definitely a risk if you’re trying to protect yourself from bigger intelligence efforts. The issue with Signal Desktop however, required full file system access to your device at which point, there is nothing stopping the attacker from simply using a key logger, capturing your screen, etc.
This is why no big security researchers called out Signal but many shunned Threema. At the end I don’t have a horse in the race for either of them, but I think those are facts people need when making a decision with their private information.
I’d also recommend taking a look at Threema.
I think their product direction is a bit better. Particularly as Signal still shows a message that they don’t back sync messages before you paired devices “for your security” … Threema also doesn’t back sync messages in their beta multi device setup, but that seems to be more less of a product stance and more of a “we just don’t do it yet.”
Threema is definitely missing some features like emoji reactions, stories, and a builtin cryptocurrency (which depending on your stances might be pros or cons).
Both apps have definitely gotten better over the years; I think Threema’s multi device support has really drained resources on their side so there hasn’t been as much outward feature work. I’m hoping it won’t be terribly long until that changes.
Why would they need crypto dawg
IMO, they wouldn’t
While it isn’t necessarily an argument against Threema’s security, I think it’s important to consider that Threema is owned by a privately held company [1[2]] — Signal is owned by a non profit [3].
References
I almost think that’s a pro. I don’t understand how signal intends to pay for servers forever with voluntary donations. Though I’d be fine if they set up a mandatory annual fee.
Signal is far more polished IMO but both are great.
In the same vein, a privately owned service, to me, is rather suspect if it is free of cost — the money’s gotta come from somewhere.
Threema sells to businesses. It’s a one time fee for personal.
Ah, so there is! [1][2[3]] I didn’t notice that. Thank you for pointing out that inconsistency in my previous comment; what I stated was conjecture, and, lo and behold, it turned out to be wrong.
References
I think donations can be sustainable if the service in question is handled correctly. Imo, federation/decentralization would improve this, as it wouldn’t place the cost burden on a single entity.
If you’re seriously concerned about privacy and security I wouldn’t look at Threema. They severely mishandled vulnerabilities by insulting the security researchers, then introduced a new protocol they built with the advice given to them for free from the SAME researchers before that, and yet it still doesn’t support critical features like full forward secrecy. If all you want primarily is the best security out there Signal is and will be the best for a long time to come by the looks of it.
I think that’s a characterization of what happened but not necessarily a good representation of what actually happened.
Yes, some researchers in Zurich found vulnerabilities. Yes they down played them … because you still couldn’t read anything. They were also already working on a new protocol before those researches wrote their paper and yes I’m sure they made some tweaks based on their findings.
This is their response; I’d hardly call it “insulting” https://threema.ch/en/blog/posts/news-alleged-weaknesses-statement
You could say the same thing about Signal’s response to their “desktop security scandal” earlier this year (of which Threema wasn’t vulnerable and Signal repeatedly refused to acknowledge as a problem).
They do support PFS (perfect forward secrecy) though their new multi-device solution doesn’t yet support it.
https://threema.ch/en/blog/posts/ibex
This is the same protocol they were already working on when the “researches they insulted” released their research finding issues with the old protocol.
Threema is also far more active with third-party audits than any other group: https://threema.ch/en/faq/code_audit
IMO this entire sentence is just wrong.
As you said, if PFS can be disabled by enabling a feature on the receiving end it’s by security practices not enabled, in the industry that’s called a downgrade attack and considered very bad practice.
The blog post you linked, is the publicly revised version after they were called out by well known cryptographers for their handling. This was their original response to the researchers, again after the researchers disclosed the vulnerabilities to them and actively helped designing the new protocol, not just giving inspiration. This was their initial tweet: „There’s a new paper on Threema’s old communication protocol. Apparently, today’s academia forces researchers and even students to hopelessly oversell their findings“ which is long deleted, but I did read it while it was still up back then. I can’t find a screenshot or anything at the moment, so if you want to call me a liar, go ahead but if you search for that quote you will find many citations.
Also, they claimed „old protocol“ but Ibex was still months from being deployed widespread, so that’s another big downplay.
You mention Signals Desktop app issue, Threema claimed the attacks were unrealistic because they require significant computing power or social engineering, both things that are definitely a risk if you’re trying to protect yourself from bigger intelligence efforts. The issue with Signal Desktop however, required full file system access to your device at which point, there is nothing stopping the attacker from simply using a key logger, capturing your screen, etc.
This is why no big security researchers called out Signal but many shunned Threema. At the end I don’t have a horse in the race for either of them, but I think those are facts people need when making a decision with their private information.
I don’t have an iOS device to know for sure but I’m fairly certain they inform you and participants in your chats about the PFS interruptions. It’s a temporary problem you have to deal with to use a beta application.
One of their devs was on mastodon talking about how PFS was more complicated with their design than they expected because they need to sync up the devices. Signal took the approach of sending one message to every device and Threema sends it to one of your devices and then that device sends it to the others. From what I understand this makes the PFS session key synchronization harder for Threema so it’s not implemented yet.
Right but in practical terms many of the findings cited against Threema were equally if not more doubtful. I don’t know who the “big security researchers” you’re referencing are, but … as someone in the tech sector myself I do tend to agree that we’ve gotten to a place of really happenstance exploits being sold as if they’re like the old zero days where the user doesn’t have to do anything, it works 100% of the time, and the user loses control of their system.
If that quote is real … I think they were probably just miffed that the researchers didn’t discuss the fact that they were already in the later design stages of protocol improvements and made their findings sound far more plausible to exploit than they were.
There’s just a double standard here too… Threema gets shit for downplaying an exploit where you literally have to have physical access to the device, but it’s totally fine that signal didn’t even use basic operating system functionality (the keychain) to protect data at rest – that’s a physical AND digital risk?
Perfect Forward Secrecy has been around since version 5.0 (as an opt in beta feature) and enabled by default since 5.1.
https://threema.ch/en/blog/posts/security-proof-ibex
Here is the original statement you’re referring to:
https://threema.ch/en/blog/posts/news-alleged-weaknesses-statement
I don’t see any insults and the vulnerabilities were patched.
I agree that they downplayed it a bit, but back then they were still a for profit company. Now they are non-profit and it is in their interest to handle such cases in a way that is more aligned with their customers instead of their profits.
I’m copying my other response since you both had the same issue with my statements:
As you said, if PFS can be disabled by enabling a feature on the receiving end it’s by security practices not enabled, in the industry that’s called a downgrade attack and considered very bad practice.
The blog post you linked, is the publicly revised version after they were called out by well known cryptographers for their handling. This was their original response to the researchers, again after the researchers disclosed the vulnerabilities to them and actively helped designing the new protocol, not just giving inspiration. This was their initial tweet: „There’s a new paper on Threema’s old communication protocol. Apparently, today’s academia forces researchers and even students to hopelessly oversell their findings“ which is long deleted, but I did read it while it was still up back then. I can’t find a screenshot or anything at the moment, so if you want to call me a liar, go ahead but if you search for that quote you will find many citations.
Also, they claimed „old protocol“ but Ibex was still months from being deployed widespread, so that’s another big downplay.
You mention Signals Desktop app issue, Threema claimed the attacks were unrealistic because they require significant computing power or social engineering, both things that are definitely a risk if you’re trying to protect yourself from bigger intelligence efforts. The issue with Signal Desktop however, required full file system access to your device at which point, there is nothing stopping the attacker from simply using a key logger, capturing your screen, etc.
This is why no big security researchers called out Signal but many shunned Threema. At the end I don’t have a horse in the race for either of them, but I think those are facts people need when making a decision with their private information.