Yes. 100%. End to end encrypted means the decryption key is at the other end. Where Apple is.
If it were ACTUALLY secure you would have BOTH the encryption AND decryption keys and Apple would only have a useless, unreadable, encrypted binary blob.
So, it does say that not even Apple can read your data, but it also says it’s protected by “end to end encryption”, which if Apple can’t read your data, is absolutely nonsense usage of the term.
“End to end encryption” means encrypting the data at one end, and decrypting it at the other end. That’s literally the NAME. If they’re not doing that, the term is completely nonsense to use. They might as well say they have fat-free encryption. What they’re really doing is storing an encrypted file that you hold both keys for. And IF that’s what they’re doing, that’s actually fantastic - far better than end-to-end encryption because only you can decrypt it. But they’re not inspiring confidence by COMPLETELY misusing a term that has nothing to do with what they’re doing.
The other point is, if those keys… if you have to manually copy those keys over between all of your devices? Great. You’re actually protected. If, however, you just connect to your Apple account and now you can get your files out of iCloud? That means that Apple DOES have your decryption keys SOMEWHERE, because otherwise they couldn’t send them to your other devices, which means, sorry, whatever they’re promising, they DO have the ability to look at your files if they’re motivated enough.
It has to be decrypted for you to use it stupid… Ffs they literally call it out in the line “No one else can access your end-to-end encrypted data, not even Apple, and this data remains secure even in the case of a data breach in the cloud.”. To apple end to end encryption is keeping the data entirely encrypted up until it hits your device where you use it… I could go on about how you misunderstand the tech but you’re better off just actually looking into how they implement it because they account for your concerns.
The fact that there are multiple seprate recovery options to regain access to your account and with it access to those encrypted backups is all the clue you need to know those keys are not stored only on your device.
Apple has access to those keys - whether they want to directly admit it or not.
“With Advanced Data Protection turned on, Apple doesn’t have the encryption keys needed to help you recover your end-to-end encrypted data.” it’s literally on the page. If they have them, prove it, and launch yourself the most profitable lawsuit against apple possible. Otherwise you’re just bring a grumpy fool.
Two things here. I’m not saying these are necessarily true, but they can be true.
-Apple could be lying.
-Apple could change their corporate policy on providing backdoor access for governments.
In the end, you are trusting a profit-seeking corporation to protect your data and conduct themselves in an ethical and honest way. They also had their phones built in factories where people threw themselves from the rooftop to escape the inhumane conditions. Just saying…
That could be true of literally any encryption you did not develop yourself and any os or hardware in the same lieu. Apple’s implementation is legally binding and third-party verified. That’s as good as you’re gonna get with any operating system you don’t entirely vet yourself, and no a third party linux distribution is not a os you manage yourself as governments local to the distrubuting party/management organization can require backdoors in even those.
In the end you are trusting other humans using their tools to do things you hope you understand but generally fully do not, so you must engage in a modicum of trust. This is just the great abstraction problem in any compute environment. Generally we base this on past or prior actions in combination with behaviors we can monitor or prove. Or should we talk about how pretty much every modern encryption scheme was minted by the NSA?.. Just saying… Right that doesn’t mean anything and I say that knowing I’ve got the loaded bullet of apple being the only corporate entity I’m familiar with to risk a public war with the US government by hosting this page despite gag orders while also refusing to implement said backdoors. https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/
In the end, your device will never be truly open source hardware + software, whether its Apple or not, so you will have to trust someone at some point if you’d like to continue using electronic devices.
True, but you can use open source software that is vetted by multiple independent 3rd party non-profit organizations that have only their own reputation to uphold, and who’s findings are verified by thousands of independent reaearchers.
Perhaps, in the end, storing your data on media you don’t actually control shouldn’t be considered as locked in a safe, but instead stored in a museum with a high price of admission.
They literally say to store your Recovery keys in a safe place or you could get locked out of your account.
If you don’t know your account password and have lost or otherwise don’t have a trusted device, you need your recovery key to regain access to your Apple Account. If you can’t provide your recovery key, you’ll be locked out of your account permanently.
Print a copy of your recovery key or write it down. Keep your key in a safe place, and consider storing a copy in more than one place. You can also give a copy of your recovery key to a trusted family member.
Don’t store your recovery key in your Apple Passwords app, iCloud Photos, Notes, or iCloud Drive. If you lose access to your Apple Account, you won’t be able to open these apps to find it.
There are no ways to recover your account if you have ADP on. Stop making stuff up. You need to have your key written down and stored somewhere safe, otherwise you are SOL and locked out forever.
It’s literally in the link in the comment this was replying to:
Recovery methods
With Advanced Data Protection turned on, Apple doesn’t have the encryption keys needed to help you recover your end-to-end encrypted data. [I do not believe this] If you ever lose access to your account, you’ll need to use one of your account recovery methods — your device passcode or password, your recovery contact, or recovery key — to recover your iCloud data.
Your device passcode or password is the passcode on your iPhone or iPad, or the login password on your Mac that you set to protect your device and enable two-factor authentication. It’s also used to reset your Apple Account password and to recover your end-to-end encrypted data if you lose access to your account.
A recovery contact is a trusted friend or family member who can use their Apple device to help you regain access to your account and data. They won’t have any access to your account, only the ability to give you a code to help you recover your account. Learn more about recovery contacts.
A recovery key is a secret 28-character code that you can use, along with a trusted phone number and an Apple device, to recover your account and data. Learn more about recovery keys.
How would a ‘trusted contact’ recover keys that are supposedly only stored on your devices, when you yourself have lost those devices; unless Apple has stored those keys elsewhere.
There’s also no telling what they’ve done with your ‘recovery key’. Just because they refuse to help you, doesn’t mean they have no access; they just won’t share that access with you, as it would blatantly expose their illusion.
There’s no way in hell I’m trusting a massive US corporation with securing my data without backdoor access. You have no way of managing encryption/recovery keys on an Apple device or seeing where/how they’ve been stored; you’ve just got to trust they handle it well for you.
I do not trust Apple; or any large profit driven corporation, particularly one that sucks up to the American government (especially THIS American Government). Not in todays age of dystopian surveillance.
How would a ‘trusted contact’ recover keys that are supposedly only stored on your devices, when you yourself have lost those devices; unless Apple has stored those keys elsewhere.
The same way E2EE works for anything else? You trust them as a device that can decrypt your keys using their own keys generated on their device. You need to do this at the time you turn on ADP. You cannot do it later.
There’s also no telling what they’ve done with your ‘recovery key’. Just because they refuse to help you, doesn’t mean they have no access; they just won’t share that access with you, as it would blatantly expose their illusion.
The key is randomly generated on your device locally and displayed to you exactly once. If you don’t write it down and store it somewhere else, you can never access it again. So, unless you have some actual data to show that the key is being transmitted anywhere, you’re just speculating without any evidence.
You don’t have to believe any of it. I don’t particularly care. But it’s wild to come out as confidently as you are when you don’t even know the basics about it.
I think they’re trying to say that while apple encrypts in transit (upload + download is sftp or some other secure transfer method that can’t be eavesdropped on), they don’t encrypt at rest, meaning the data is written in decrypted format to disk. Which is a data security no-no for mine and most enterprises out there. They’re alleging that if someone got into an apple server, they’d be able to read your data and anyone elses.
Now that might not be true but I don’t see apple saying otherwise anywhere obvious. It’s not true. I’m pretty sure Google do this though. They retain a level of access to train their ai models and other deep learning algorithms on what you write in docs or the photos you upload.
I’m assuming someone is tired here, and it could well be me, but isn’t that quite literally what I said? People were saying E2EE doesn’t mean the data is secure when it gets there, I was trying to separate the discussion into at rest (secure storage) vs in transit (E2EE) because they’re different applications of encryption. I wasn’t really intending to argue about Apple’s practice’s.
From reading, it is encrypted at rest, which sounds like an Apple thing to do. Decrypted at rest feels very Google. Apple state on their standard plan they store the keys in their data centres which I think is what others were talking about? They say they can help recover them so they’re accessible in some capacity between the user and Apple.
On their advanced plan details:
Advanced Data Protection for iCloud is an optional setting that offers our highest level of cloud data security. If you choose to enable Advanced Data Protection, your trusted devices retain sole access to the encryption keys for the majority of your iCloud data, thereby protecting it using end-to-end encryption. Additional data protected includes iCloud Backup, Photos, Notes, and more
E2E in the context of data stored at rest conceptually just means that “current you” is sending data to “future you” where the two ends are “current you” and “future you.”
Always question and audit the implementation of any E2E claim by a vendor, but the term itself refers to how only those with authorized access can decrypt, and that the service provider itself need not be authorized.
If anyone can prove that this implementation has security vulnerabilities (such as Apple being able to view your footage), you are in for a huge payday.
I wouldn’t bet on that.
E2E doesn’t matter if you don’t control the other end.
Yes. 100%. End to end encrypted means the decryption key is at the other end. Where Apple is.
If it were ACTUALLY secure you would have BOTH the encryption AND decryption keys and Apple would only have a useless, unreadable, encrypted binary blob.
They literally give you the keys. See Advanced Data Protection
So, it does say that not even Apple can read your data, but it also says it’s protected by “end to end encryption”, which if Apple can’t read your data, is absolutely nonsense usage of the term.
“End to end encryption” means encrypting the data at one end, and decrypting it at the other end. That’s literally the NAME. If they’re not doing that, the term is completely nonsense to use. They might as well say they have fat-free encryption. What they’re really doing is storing an encrypted file that you hold both keys for. And IF that’s what they’re doing, that’s actually fantastic - far better than end-to-end encryption because only you can decrypt it. But they’re not inspiring confidence by COMPLETELY misusing a term that has nothing to do with what they’re doing.
The other point is, if those keys… if you have to manually copy those keys over between all of your devices? Great. You’re actually protected. If, however, you just connect to your Apple account and now you can get your files out of iCloud? That means that Apple DOES have your decryption keys SOMEWHERE, because otherwise they couldn’t send them to your other devices, which means, sorry, whatever they’re promising, they DO have the ability to look at your files if they’re motivated enough.
End to end means the ends you use it at, ot the server you’re imagining it ending up on.
In this case the “ends” are your devices.
It has to be decrypted for you to use it stupid… Ffs they literally call it out in the line “No one else can access your end-to-end encrypted data, not even Apple, and this data remains secure even in the case of a data breach in the cloud.”. To apple end to end encryption is keeping the data entirely encrypted up until it hits your device where you use it… I could go on about how you misunderstand the tech but you’re better off just actually looking into how they implement it because they account for your concerns.
The fact that there are multiple seprate recovery options to regain access to your account and with it access to those encrypted backups is all the clue you need to know those keys are not stored only on your device.
Apple has access to those keys - whether they want to directly admit it or not.
“With Advanced Data Protection turned on, Apple doesn’t have the encryption keys needed to help you recover your end-to-end encrypted data.” it’s literally on the page. If they have them, prove it, and launch yourself the most profitable lawsuit against apple possible. Otherwise you’re just bring a grumpy fool.
Two things here. I’m not saying these are necessarily true, but they can be true.
-Apple could be lying.
-Apple could change their corporate policy on providing backdoor access for governments.
In the end, you are trusting a profit-seeking corporation to protect your data and conduct themselves in an ethical and honest way. They also had their phones built in factories where people threw themselves from the rooftop to escape the inhumane conditions. Just saying…
That could be true of literally any encryption you did not develop yourself and any os or hardware in the same lieu. Apple’s implementation is legally binding and third-party verified. That’s as good as you’re gonna get with any operating system you don’t entirely vet yourself, and no a third party linux distribution is not a os you manage yourself as governments local to the distrubuting party/management organization can require backdoors in even those.
In the end you are trusting other humans using their tools to do things you hope you understand but generally fully do not, so you must engage in a modicum of trust. This is just the great abstraction problem in any compute environment. Generally we base this on past or prior actions in combination with behaviors we can monitor or prove. Or should we talk about how pretty much every modern encryption scheme was minted by the NSA?.. Just saying… Right that doesn’t mean anything and I say that knowing I’ve got the loaded bullet of apple being the only corporate entity I’m familiar with to risk a public war with the US government by hosting this page despite gag orders while also refusing to implement said backdoors. https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/
Here is what I think of Apple’s decade old customer letter…
https://appleinsider.com/articles/25/10/23/apple-amongst-us-tech-giants-backing-trumps-white-house-ballroom-reno
https://www.axios.com/2025/01/03/tim-cook-apple-donate-1-million-trump-inauguration
Businesses “Standing up to Trump” was so 2016. 2025 was the year of “bend the knee, kiss the rings, work the shaft.”
In the end, your device will never be truly open source hardware + software, whether its Apple or not, so you will have to trust someone at some point if you’d like to continue using electronic devices.
True, but you can use open source software that is vetted by multiple independent 3rd party non-profit organizations that have only their own reputation to uphold, and who’s findings are verified by thousands of independent reaearchers.
Perhaps, in the end, storing your data on media you don’t actually control shouldn’t be considered as locked in a safe, but instead stored in a museum with a high price of admission.
They literally say to store your Recovery keys in a safe place or you could get locked out of your account.
Set up a recovery key for your Apple Account
They do not.
There are no ways to recover your account if you have ADP on. Stop making stuff up. You need to have your key written down and stored somewhere safe, otherwise you are SOL and locked out forever.
It’s literally in the link in the comment this was replying to:
How would a ‘trusted contact’ recover keys that are supposedly only stored on your devices, when you yourself have lost those devices; unless Apple has stored those keys elsewhere.
There’s also no telling what they’ve done with your ‘recovery key’. Just because they refuse to help you, doesn’t mean they have no access; they just won’t share that access with you, as it would blatantly expose their illusion.
There’s no way in hell I’m trusting a massive US corporation with securing my data without backdoor access. You have no way of managing encryption/recovery keys on an Apple device or seeing where/how they’ve been stored; you’ve just got to trust they handle it well for you.
I do not trust Apple; or any large profit driven corporation, particularly one that sucks up to the American government (especially THIS American Government). Not in todays age of dystopian surveillance.
The same way E2EE works for anything else? You trust them as a device that can decrypt your keys using their own keys generated on their device. You need to do this at the time you turn on ADP. You cannot do it later.
The key is randomly generated on your device locally and displayed to you exactly once. If you don’t write it down and store it somewhere else, you can never access it again. So, unless you have some actual data to show that the key is being transmitted anywhere, you’re just speculating without any evidence.
You don’t have to believe any of it. I don’t particularly care. But it’s wild to come out as confidently as you are when you don’t even know the basics about it.
Ding ding ding!!!
The test of E2E encryption is “who manages the keys?” If the answer isn’t me, it isn’t E2E encrypted.
The user manages the keys per https://lemmy.world/comment/25340338
I think they’re trying to say that while apple encrypts in transit (upload + download is sftp or some other secure transfer method that can’t be eavesdropped on), they don’t encrypt at rest, meaning the data is written in decrypted format to disk. Which is a data security no-no for mine and most enterprises out there. They’re alleging that if someone got into an apple server, they’d be able to read your data and anyone elses.
Now that might not be true but I don’t see apple saying otherwise anywhere obvious.It’s not true. I’m pretty sure Google do this though. They retain a level of access to train their ai models and other deep learning algorithms on what you write in docs or the photos you upload.Thats not how it works at all. The traffic is encrypted locally on the device before it even gets sent to Apple.
I’m assuming someone is tired here, and it could well be me, but isn’t that quite literally what I said? People were saying E2EE doesn’t mean the data is secure when it gets there, I was trying to separate the discussion into at rest (secure storage) vs in transit (E2EE) because they’re different applications of encryption. I wasn’t really intending to argue about Apple’s practice’s.
From reading, it is encrypted at rest, which sounds like an Apple thing to do. Decrypted at rest feels very Google. Apple state on their standard plan they store the keys in their data centres which I think is what others were talking about? They say they can help recover them so they’re accessible in some capacity between the user and Apple.
On their advanced plan details:
E2E in the context of data stored at rest conceptually just means that “current you” is sending data to “future you” where the two ends are “current you” and “future you.”
Always question and audit the implementation of any E2E claim by a vendor, but the term itself refers to how only those with authorized access can decrypt, and that the service provider itself need not be authorized.
You don’t have to bet on it. Just look it up.
Trolls never do the legwork.
Not sure if I’m the troll, or the other guy, but just in case I’ll add this.
https://support.apple.com/en-lb/guide/security-pdf/sec525461d19/web
If anyone can prove that this implementation has security vulnerabilities (such as Apple being able to view your footage), you are in for a huge payday.